economy's poor productivity performance in the l97Os, as well as with the erosion of international competitiveness that began much earlier but also became more evident in the 1970s with the dramatic declines in the international exchange value of the dollar, has elevated what was once largely a business interest into a much more widely shared goal. In today's environment groups representing labor and consumers also recognize the need for capital investment to create jobs and to raise productivity and hence the population's overall standard of living. On the whole, public discussion has moved from whether more capital formation is desirable to what policies can best achieve it.
An important aspect of capital formation that this discussion has often overlooked, however, is its explicitly financial side. In an economy like that of the United States, each decision to create more physical capital necessarily has a financial counterpart. This financial counterpart may be a single transaction, but in an economy with highly developed financial markets it is more likely to be an entire chain of obligations and transfers leading from an ultimate saver to an ultimate investor. In the end the financial and nonfinancial systems interact so that the allocation of the economy's real resources -whether to make consumer goods or producer goods, for example, or how much and what kind of each -exactly corresponds to its allocation of financial resources.
The financial aspect of the capital formation process is especially -2- important in a public policy context for two reasons. First, the financial transactions associated with capital formation are not merely a reflection of real resource allocations that would necessarily come about in any case.
The setting in which the financing of capital formation takes place can also be a key determinant of real resource allocations, including not only the total amount of capital formation but also its composition. The financial and the nonfinancial elements of the process jointly determine one another, and public policy may affect the ultimate outcome by influencing either.
Indeed, financial aspects of private capital formation decisions, like a firm's after-tax borrowing costs, may be much more readily subject to public policy influence than physical aspects like the production rates of the latest machine models.
A second reason why the financial side of capital formation is so important for public policy is that, when financial markets are as fully integrated into the economy's life pulse as they are in the United States, fragility of the financial structure can pose major hazards for the entire economic system. Moreover, there are sound. reasons for believing that the considerations determining the actions of individual financial market participants do not adequately reflect potential threats to the system as a whole from too brittle a financial structure at the aggregate level. Financial structure is therefore a kind of "public good" in the familiar sense that an individual's (or individual firm's) actions bear "externalities" potentially affecting everyone else. Because there is no reason for the presence of such externalities to affect directly the decisions of individual financial market participants, there is a role for public policy in providing incentives that will in the end lead to a more satisfactory aggregate financial structure.
The object of this paper is to consider, from the financial perspective, -3-both the setting of and the prospects for Pxnerican capital formation in the l980s, and to focus in particular on the opportunities (and pitfalls) for public policy. Section I reviews the evolution of investment and saving in the United States during the last quarter-century and emphasizes the connection between the allocation of physical and financial resources. Section II examines in detail the financing of investment through the economy's nonfinancial corporate business sector, which historically has accounted for nearly three-quarters of all U.S. investment in plant and equipment. Section III develops more fully the concept of externalities associated with private financial actions and the resulting role for public policy. Section IV focuses on three specific aspects of corporate financing decisions -internal versus external funds, equity versus debt within the external component, and the maturity of the debt -and identifies in each case the issues for public policy. Section V provides a brief summary of the paper's principal conclusions.
-4-
I. Physical Capital Formation and Financial Capital Formation
The principal development that has spurred interest in increased U.S. capital formation as a goal for the 1980s has been the economy's deteriorating productivity performance, in conjunction with its declining rate of net investment in productive plant and equipment. The productivity of labor in the U.S. nonfarm private business sector increased by 2.6% per annum during 1948-65, and 2.2% per annum during 1965-73, but only 0.6% per annum during l973_79.1
Although neither 1978 nor 1979 was a recession year, labor productivity declined absolutely in both, marking the first two-year continuous productivity fall in U.S. postwar history. With a recession in 1980, productivity has now declined for still a third successive year.
In principle, any or all of a number of potential explanations may help to account for the U.S. productivity slowdown.2 There is evidence that the rate of technical progress has slowed, probably as a result of the trend away from research and development activities undertaken by industry. There is also evidence that both capital and labor resources have become less mobile, and hence less able to adapt to changing technologies and consumer tastes. Demographic factors were rendering the labor force progressively younger, and hence less experienced and less skilled, until the very end of the 1970s. Government regulation has added increased burdens to production, importantly so in many industries. Slower output growth per se also typically exerts downward pressure on productivity, and the 1970s were a recessionprone, slow-growth era, at least in comparison with the l960s.3
The increased attention to the nation's capital formation rate, however, has brought into a single focus the role of capital -that is, plant and equipment -in the basic production of goods and services. Although economists investigating the production process have often found the role of -5-capital frustratingly difficult to quantify, both economic theory and empirical evidence make clear that fixed capital is essential to production in the modern economy.4 Table 1 The experience reviewed in the bottom panel of Table 1 in particular suggests clearly why capital formation has received increased attention as the economy's productivity performance has slipped during the l970s. Although gross investment in plant and equipment has moved to a progressively larger share of the nation's total gross national product, the corresponding net investment has shown a sharp reversal since the late l960s. Indeed, by the late l970s the share of total output devoted to net investment in plant and equipment was almost back to the level of the late l950s, and the growth rate of the capital stock had fallen back accordingly. In light of the economy's declining net capital formation rate, it is hardly surprising that the amount of capital available to each employed u.s. worker has actually declined since 1974 after rising steadily at 3% per annum during the previous twentyfive years.
Moreover, even the dramatic decline in the net investment rate shown in these statistics may understate the true extent of the effective reduction in the economy's productive capital investment. One reason is that at least part of net capital outlays in recent years have gone into special investments that protect the environment, or enhance workers' health and safety, but do Source: u.s. Department of Commerce. -6- not otherwise increase capacity to produce the items included in conventional measures of output and productivity. In addition, the sharply higher price of energy relative to the prices of other inputs to the production process (especially labor) has changed the appropriate mix of those inputs to be used, so that substantial amounts of labor-saving but energy-consuming capital are no longer economical.5
Increasing the economy's investment rate is, at one level, a matter of the allocation of real resources. Although additional capital increases the economy's productive capacity once it is available for use, in the short run resources are fixed, and devoting more to any one use means devoting less to something else. Devoting a larger share of output to business fixed investment than the 1980 level of 11.3% would require devoting a smaller share to consumer spending (63.7% in 1980), or to purchases of goods and services by federal or state and local governments (7.6% and 12.8%, respectively), or to residential investment (4.0%).6
Increasing the economy's investment rate is also a matter of the allocation of financial resources, however. An important key to understanding the functioning of any economy is the truism that, on an ex post basis, the economy's saving must equal its investment. Since it is unlikely in a decentralized market economy that ex ante plans for saving and investment will precisely balance one another, the market mechanism must influence the decisions of businesses and consumers so as to change these inconsistent ex ante plans into consistent ex post actions. Financial markets play a large role in this mechanism, generating adjustments in the real yield which the market pays to savers as suppliers of funds and in the cost and availability factors which confront those who demand funds to invest in productive plant and equipment, office buildings, inventories, and residential construction. If plans to -7-supply funds exceed plans to demand funds, the market excess leads to increased availability and a decline in yields. If plans to supply funds fall short of plans to demand funds, the market shortage leads to reduced availability and higher yields. The result is that, ex post, saving equals investment.
The function of the financial markets goes even further, however. of output devoted to investment will probably be smaller.
-8- itself reflected the net result of two sharp but opposing trends, as federal purchases of goods and services have represented a steadily declining share of gross national product (from 11.2% to 7.3%) and federal transfer payments a steadily rising share (6.0% to 12.9%). Both the goods and services purchases, which represent the govermnnt's own use of economic resources, and the transfers, which represent the government's redirection of claims on these resources within the private economy, must be financed.
The federal government's receipts from taxes and Social Security contributions have also increased in relation to the overall economy over these years, but only from 18.4% of gross national product during 1956-60 to 20.0% during 1976-80. The shortfall from the corresponding growth of federal expenditures, shown in Table 2 as a steadily growing negative surplus, has therefore represented a direct absorption of the private saving available to finance investment. To the extent that the government itself has undertaken investment activities, however including either infrastructure investments like highways and bridges, or directly productive investments like hospitals and power facilities -the familiar private investment data shown in Table 2 understate the economy's overall investment total.
On the gross investment side in Table 2 , the one clear trend during this period has been the increasing share of output devoted to gross investment in plant and equipment, as already indicated in Table 1 The balance of saving and investment (again, except for statistical discrepancy) shown in Table 2 As Table 3 shows, nonfinancial business corporations have consistently accounted for nearly three-fourths of all U.S. plant and equipment investment. No other single readily identifiable group has even accounted for as much as 10% of the total -although the miscellaneous category, presumably a catch-all for individuals and unincorporated firms apart from farms, has consistently represented some 10-15%. While the remaining one-fourth of investment is hardly unimportant, any major increase in U.S. fixed investment activity is likely in large part to involve the nonfinancial corporate business sector.
Just as the corporate sector bulks large in the nation's total plant and equipment investment, investing in plant and equipment represents a large share of the corporate sector's activity. As Table 4 shows, nonfinancial business corporations typically use far more funds for physical investment than for financial investment, and plant and equipment is by far the dominant focus among corporate-sector physical investments)0 The table also shows that the increase in total U.S. plant and equipment investment as a share of gross national product indicated in Table 1 has been entirely due to the corporate sector. The increase from 9.8% of the nation's output devoted to gross investment in plant and equipment in the late l950s to 11.0% in the late l970s has simply reflected the corresponding increase from 6.9% to 8.1%
in corporate-sector plant and equipment investment in relation to gross national product. As Table 5 shows, until the late l970s the corporate sector increasingly financed its investment in physical and financial assets by raising external funds.
(The total sources of funds in Table 5 differs from the total uses of funds in Table 4 financial markets is that, in so doing, they also perform an important allocative function. At the aggregate level the market mechanism determines the overall amount of the economy's income to be saved, and hence the overall amount of its output to be devoted to augmenting the physical capital stock.
At the underlying level of the micro-unit, the same process enables a multi- decide which firm's equities to buy, or to which firm to lend via securities or other loan arrangements, they do so on the basis of the prospects for return and the apparent risks associated with that firm's equities or debt claims.
-15-For firms in nonfinancial businesses, however, the prospective returns and risks associated with its securities mostly reflect the returns and risks associated with the firm's underlying real activity, based on its physical assets, its human resources, its organization, and other features of its business. If a firm's managers believe that it can expand in ways that will generate unusually high returns, even after allowance for risk, they will be prepared to pay a greater than average return in order to attract financial resources. If savers (or their agents) similarly assess the firm's prospects, they will advance financial resources to the firm on that basis. Because the economy's overall financial resources are scarce, mirroring the scarcity of real resources, each firm's ability to attract funds to finance its expansion necessarily limits the expansion of other firms. By ilocating financial resources in this way, the competitive market system ultimately determines not just the overall rate but also the specific directions of the economy's real expansion.
The efficiency of the financial resource allocation process -and hence of the economy's chosen growth path -is not a matter of concern to the individual saver or to any one firm, however. The nature of a competitive system is that each participant pursues only his own objectives, yet in so doing contributes to the establishment of signals and incentives which steer all participants in the direction that best contributes to the efficiency of the overall outcome. For the system to operate effectively, therefore, any aspect of individual decision making that matters for the overall outcome should also influence the prices and yields to which the individual decisions respond. If financial decisions at the level of the micro-unit bear aggregate level implications that these prices and yields do not reflect, then the resulting "externality" will prevent the system from directing individual financial -16-decisions so as to Constitute, in total, the most efficient overall outcome.
The primary area in which modern financial markets may be subject to such externality problems is that of risk. To be sure, market participants acutely analyze the risks associated with any specific individual borrower or firm raising either debt or equity funds, and the yield or prospective return set by the market as a whole in Principle does reflect such risks in each case. Moreover, the market tends to price these risks in ways that sYstematically vary between individuals and business firms, among both individuals and firms according to a rich variety of criteria, and from one stage of the economic cycle to another. 15 What the financial markets may not price, however, is the collective risk to the economy as a whole associated not with any individual borrower's debt per se but, instead, with the economy-wide aggregate debt position.
In industrially advanced economies with highly developed financial markets, a complex financial structure typically supports most real activities including especially the basic business sector. As is clear in Table 5 Table 5 , has led over time to a steady reduction in the average maturity of these corporations i Outstanding debt. As Table 7 shows, the short-term share of U.S. nonfinancial business corporations' outstanding debt rose from
Only one-fifth of the total at year-end 1955 to well over one-fourth at year-end 1980, so that during these years the corporate sector's outstanding short-term debt more than doubled in relation to gross national product.
As the combination of greater leverage, more intermediation and shorter maturities continue to increase the U.S. economy's aggregate_level financial risk, the externality associated with individual financial decisions that do not take this aggregate_1el risk into account becomes progressively more of a problem. The role for public policy with respect to the nation's financial markets is accordingly greater. In addition to using the financial system to achieve the amount of overall capital formation judged appropriate on macroeconomic grounds, and protecting the system's competitive aspects so as to promote the efficient allocation of that capital, aGgregate-level risk represents yet a third focus of public Policy with respect to the financial markets. The containment or reduction of this aggragate_l financial risk is, in effect, a "public good." Moreover, the more capital formation the nation undertakes -and hence the more financing it does -the more important this public good becomes. 
Corporate Finance and Public Policy
Three distinct aspects of the corporate financing decision, as illustrated in Table 5 , represent areas in which public pol±y may exert influence over the amount and composition of capital formation undertaken in the United
States, and on the aggregate_l risk associated with financing that capital formation: internal versus external funds, equity versus debt Within the external component, and features of the debt including especially maturity. Internal versus External Funds. To the extent that the competitive market mechanism represents the most efficient available system for allocating scarce capital resources, an emphasis on external sources of funds to finance an increased rate of capital formation would best endure the direction of that capital toward those industries, and those companies Within particular industries, that provide the best opportunity for Putting the added capital to productive use. Conversely, the more firms simply redeploy the financial resources that they generate internally, Without having to face the market test in attracting new capital, the less role the competitive market system plays in Promoting efficient allocations. Similarly, if governme distorts capital formation away from market_determined allocations by means of direct or indirect subsidies (or by differential taxation), it substitutes its own more limited information gathering and decision making system for that of the financial markets.
A corporation relying largely on internal funds is, of course, not entirely exempt from the judgment of the market. The market still prices the company's shares, and shareholders seeking improved returns may exert some influence on the firm's management. In addition, if the market places too low a value on a corporationis shares, it sometimes becomes attractive for new ownership, prepared to provide new management, to acquire a controlling Much recent discussion has focused on tax incentives to stimulate personal saving by raising after-tax returns, although the historical variation of personal saving as a share of total income (see again Table 8 shows, net funds raised by the federal government have steadily increased not just in relation to gross national product but as a share of the total funds raised by all nonfinancial sectors in the u.s. credit markets. In addition, the government's use of its sponsored financial intermediaries has jncreasiflgly absorbed still more funds, which these intermediaries then have usually passed on to noncorporate borrowers for purposes other than investment in plant and equipment.
One major way for public policy to promote externally financed capital formation, therefore, would be to reduce the government's claims on the Nevertheless, a corporation15 choice of whether to issue debt or equity securities, as well as a saver's choice of bonds or stocks for his portfolio, is hardly independent of public policy influence. The likely avenues of Policy influence in this area lie with the tax code's treatment of the respective costs and returns associated with debt and equity instruments.
Probably the greatest such single influence in the United States in recent years has been the discrimination between debt and equity forms of pay-out at the corporate level under the corporate profit tax.25 Because the tax code allows interest payments (but not dividends) as a deduction from corporate profit taxes, in most circuInstces a corporation can reduce the total taxes due from its operations by financing its assets with debt instead of equity. Moreover, the interaction of the tax code and accelerating price inflation has made this discrimination all the more Powerful in recent years, as nominal interest rates have risen to reflect the inflation premium necessary to compensate lenders for the reduction in the real value of their principal.
It is impossible to know the extent to which the tax code's discrimination in favor of debt and against equity has accounted for the observed pattern of corporate external financing. Even so, it is clear that eliminating this discrimination would at least remove corporations' current disincentive The federal government is also a borrower in these markets, however, and evidence suggests that the government has at least some significant ability to influence the relative interest rates on short-and long-term instruments by the management of its own debt.27 Because lenders are not indifferent to the varying risk characteristics of securities of dissimilar maturity, the more the government issues short-instead of long-term debt, the higher will be short-relative to long-term interest rates, and vice versa. 2. See Kendrick [20] for an analysis of these factors, jncluding and low were, respectivY 16 .6% (1965) and 13.4% (1958) for total gross saving and 17.3% (1956) and 13.8% (1958) for total gross investment. 
